Showing posts with label TamiFlu Resistance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TamiFlu Resistance. Show all posts

2009-11-22

TamiFlu Resistant Cluster of 4 at Duke Medical Center, North Carolina, US

As the thirteenth TamiFlu Resistant sequence was released publicly by Italy demonstrating a hypermorphic progression to another novel strain, the Duke University Medical Center contemporaneously described a group of patients acquiring PF11 Influenza in an isolated ward of their hospital.  Four of the patients from this isolated ward were found to be infected with a TamiFlu Resistant strain.  Transmission is suspected and may be verified by publication of all sequences from that ward over a time period covering two weeks prior, during and two weeks after the event.  Three of the four patients had fatal outcomes (75%).

Antiviral resistance has now been documented in 50 instances, when investigated, including North America, Europe and widely across Asian countries.  The 13 sequences that are available are, for the most part, incomplete for research into cross-segment linking of Hemagglutinin (HA) polymorphisms correlative to the antiviral-resistance conferring H275Y Neuraminidase (NA).  Investigators are left at bare benches staring into empty beakers waiting for catalyst. 

The resistance marker is now found on numerous backgrounds potentially demonstrating an ability to travel as a silent sub-species.  Up to this current stage of the pandemic virus progression, this resistance trait, in several cases, appears to arise in an individual as the prominent super-infection (co-infecting silent H275Y PF11 strain) based on some unidentified characteristic of the individual's host-pathogen meshing, including immune dysregulation or other existing Cytokinic Dysregulation morbidities.

Publication of the remaining 37 sequences, including the Duke University Medical Center clinicals from this prestigious research institution, may benefit worldwide understanding of the efficacy and longevity of currently promulgated mediation measures for PF11.

For additional background on the clinical and epidemiological observational facts concerning Pandemic Influenza H1N1, please refer to the Table of Contents for PF11 Trends & Issues, Mid-Term.


Please visit GeneWurx.com for insight into the latest published studies.

GeneWurx.com

2009-09-24

TamiFlu Shortage in Prime Risk Group Occurs Only 4 Weeks After School Starts

Children congregating in schools and universities appear to be the highest risk group for PF11 infection.  School has been in session for approximately 4 weeks.  Very little cold weather has occurred in the United States at this time.

Roche announced today that a shortage exists in their production of TamiFlu for children (liquid form).  The company advised pharmacists to grind the adult pill-based drug and adjust the dosage for children. 

Health officials say that priority will be given to those hospitalised.  If TamiFlu is effective only if used within 48 hours of symptoms and more than half of some populations do not present with the official case definition of fever, then few who are hospitalised will be within that 48 hour window.  Hospitalisation will primarily occur after significant viral replication time has passed (>48 hours) and the patient presents with incapacitating signals.  This prioritisation appears to be misguided given the Facts.

  • TamiFlu resistance is geographically widespread in PF11 as demonstrated in the sequence databases.
  • PF11 has not yet begun to peak. 
  • Public health officials expect cold weather combined with the school gatherings to spur the case count substantially.
These three material impacts on the pandemic combined with the early shortage of the primary mediation measure espoused by public health officials leaves the public with very few, publicly-messaged, viable options.

Please review our research section discussing proposed mediation measures for further information.

For additional background on the clinical and epidemiological observational facts concerning Pandemic Influenza H1N1, please refer to the Table of Contents for PF11 Trends & Issues, Mid-Term.


Please visit GeneWurx.com for insight into the latest published studies.

GeneWurx.com

2009-09-15

TamiFlu Resistance Database Expands, But Remains Incomplete. Two Year Pandemic Predicted.

Many TamiFlu Resistant cases have been reported that have not been sequenced and deposited in the United States and worldwide. 

Dr. Jonathan McCullers of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Tennessee reported a TamiFlu Resistant case yesterday, along with 12 child ICU cases and one child death.  Dr. McCullers indicates "a tremendous rise in cases" which began approximately one week after school resumed, well within the 3-10 day incubation period that we predicted post-congregation.  Dr. McCullers maintains that we are in the beginning of a two year pandemic that will have multiple peaks.  We agree that a period of 13 to 24 months from March 2009 is well within the expected duration.  Considering PF11's current position in the inter-species Influenza Flux and the high genetic variance demonstrated by the Hydra Effect, the lower boundary of our estimate (13 months) is unlikely unless the Case Fatality Rate increases significantly because PF11 rapidly depletes the population of potential hosts.

23 clinical observations have been publically discussed as TamiFlu Resistant in recent weeks around the world and most are not yet sequenced and deposited.  These cases concur with many of the geographic regions having sequences on file that match current TamiFlu Resistant sequences but for the H275Y.  In other words, the genetic acquisitions were predictable and expected to occur upon a proximal donor with 275Y co-infecting a host in that region.  An opportunity to review the full diversity of the anti-viral resistant strains would allow determination if, in fact, a silent spread of human-fit and reasonably transmissible TamiFlu Resistant strains is underway at this time or if we are seeing the improbability of an extensive and accurate selection due to treatment that is currently being purported as an explanation.  Evidence exists tending toward a silent spread, including that a substantial list is described with very early sampling and detection of H275Y, prior to any acceptable period for de novo / selective revision.  A minor sub-population of 275Y may be incorporated widely into the PF11 reservoir at this time.

The two youth in early July attending the North Carolina summer camp either spread their PF11 version one to the other or were each infected from a common carrier with a parental PF11 275Y Neuraminidase as is evidenced by the co-factor SNP on the NA of their sequences coding for 223V, known to amplify the 275Y TamiFlu resistance in H3N2.

We would like to thank those teams who have placed their sequences on deposit at GenBank and GISAID for the scientific community to evaluate.  The NA and HA for TamiFlu Resistant A/Singapore/57 from 2009-05-30 are again downloadable from the European EpiFlu database as GISAID has thankfully been able to re-establish access to their data.

TamiFlu Resistance is indicated in typical PF11 fashion via a Single Nucleotide Polymorphism on Singapore57 coding for 275Y on the Neuraminidase. The sequence displays the following NA Quadruple Combination:

106I, 248D, 275Y, 286S

The following permutations are now represented on the nine PF11 anti-viral resistant sequences:

106V, 248N, 275Y, 286S = WA28, WA29, TX47
106I, 248N, 275Y, 286S = Osaka180
106I, 248D, 275Y, 286S = HK2369, Yamaguchi22, Denmark528, Hunan SWL3, Singapore57

Until the 2009-08-21 deposit of the two Washington sequences at GenBank, all 275Y TamiFlu-Resistant specimens on PF11 backgrounds were paired with 106I. Today we see 3 of 9 with 106V.

The addition of Singapore57 re-leverages position 248 to Aspartate (D) with 5 specimens versus 4 with Asparagine (N).  No TamiFlu Resistant specimen on file displays 286G as yet.

A more robust database of sequences would be useful to invigorate the scientific community and the public in navigating this distant journey.

An n higher than 9 may assist us to align.


For additional background on the clinical and epidemiological observational facts concerning Pandemic Influenza H1N1, please refer to the Table of Contents for PF11 Trends & Issues, Mid-Term.



Please visit GeneWurx.com for insight into the latest published studies.

GeneWurx.com

2009-08-25

Where is PF11 going?

No one knows as a certainty.

The “science” of Influenza genetics is far from well-developed concerning predictions. The literature remains peppered with phrases like "Surprisingly", "Unexpected" and "Data not provided" in areas that other studies claim to have proven; the "science" foundation for genetic prediction is yet small.  Most leading Influenza researchers are unwilling and unable to go on public record with vectors or potential paths of viral development. The “science” of Influenza and viral genetics is relatively young and though ground is being gained in the content arena, predictability using the current two pillars dogma is rarely undertaken because the protocols were built in an era that had only a low quantity of low quality data. New models of thinking and new protocols of investigation are required that incorporate the proofs demonstrated within the current reservoir of available data.

The recent high availability of PF11 sequences and clinical reports has given us data to understand where the virus is going, especially the much desired and appreciated sequences from South America shared by the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University. The sequences are from Argentina where the highest official death count in the world has caused healthcare rationing in all 77 hospitals in the socialized medicine system of Argentina. Many other countries in Latin America are refusing health services due to supply, personnel and infrastructure failures.

Genetic Acquisition Analysis

A managed campaign of political and laboratory messages in the media continues to state that no changes are found in Pandemic Influenza H1N1. The underlying genetics database, however, demonstrates many acquisitions and a consistent trend of fitness-inducing polymorphisms. As samples have been added each week around the world, a pattern has emerged.

The pattern indicates a persistent hyper-morphic state on the PF11 background at certain positions within particular species. Of certain note is the directional movement on the Hemagglutinin (variously termed HA and H1) and Neuraminidase (variously termed NA and N1) segments. Though all Influenza consistently recombines with existing genetic material from proximal non-self strains, PF11 has demonstrated a march toward human-fit acquisition that is remarkable in speed and geographic spread.

The purpose of these point by point studies is to indicate and discuss several of those key polymorphisms and examine the potential next steps in humans. As you have seen finally released in the media, PF11 in the human-form has now been sequence-confirmed in birds and in swine, allowing hundreds of species as additional “mixing vessels” or recombination reservoirs. This predicted species jump, more importantly, provides flight-based transportation vectors that will easily number in the millions of infected birds with a potential pool of billions in various seasons.

Recall the CDC reports that 70% of all emerging diseases are zoonotic (originate in animals). The asymptomatic flight-based animals transport the disease from their land-based counterparts, the swine, who are playing their normal role as ideal mixing reservoirs for recombination due to their robust tolerance to many strains of Influenza. Pig=>Duck=>Human=>Chicken=>Pig and dozens of additional paired vectors of transmission have been confirmed between human, swine and avian species. The genetic transition state between species, the Influenza Flux, is dangerous for humans due to continual creation of novel antigen and species-specific phenotypical traits that strain the human immune system, elevate the potential for vaccine escape and may produce a negative interplay with that nemesis of vaccine scientists, Original Antigenic Sin (OAS). 

OAS, in a few words, describes the physiological phenomenon observed since 1960 that antibody production to a novel virus is mediated and frequently downgraded by the priming epitope or first infection in an individual host from that species of virus (original childhood infection).  Frequent exposure to novel antigens within a virus species (notably Influenza), via vaccine and/or natural infection, tends to create fewer and fewer new antibodies that bind properly to the slightly dissimilar recent virus / antigen.  The documented process counter-intuitively invokes high-specificity memory B cells from the priming epitope (original childhood infection) which then feeds back signals to reduce the activation of naive B cells toward the new antigen.  Studies observe situations where Antibody Secreting Cells (ASC) produce antibodies to earlier infections in a ratio higher than antibodies to the new infection.

In short, PF11 at this time continues to create a Hydra Effect, attacking the human with many different heads or genetic variations.  The Hydra Effect coupled with the observed Interferon-Deranging Rapid Replication Viral (IDRRV) property creates a unique and daunting foe.

We will overview our findings on four gene segments with discussion on inter-segment correlations.




The reservoir of fitness-inducing polymorphisms available to PF11 is vast as we’ve determined 4 or more backgrounds in circulation that may have been slow, but consistent, donors to PF11.


 
The related reservoir has much more to offer in the coming months as the most important changes have either not yet been introduced or have not become fixed. Several of these candidate donor backgrounds are matches to provide one or more of the polymorphisms that have been demonstrated in the lab and shown clinically to strengthen Influenza against humans.

Remember that, although many are dying horrible deaths from PF11, this virus, as it stands today, is still most definitely hobbled / limited by many genetic shortcomings. The viral development process appears to be correcting those shortcomings by accepting consistent donations from the able reservoir of circulating Influenza strains worldwide.




We expect that PB2:627K (Increased Human Virulence) and NA:275Y (TamiFlu resistance) will be discovered widely in PF11. Relenza resistance is impossible to characterise at this time due to data paucity.

For a more complete and ongoing analysis, please read our PF11 Genetic Acquisitions studies.

For additional background on the clinical and epidemiological observational facts concerning Pandemic Influenza H1N1, please refer to the Table of Contents for PF11 Trends & Issues, Mid-Term.


Please visit GeneWurx.com for insight into the latest published studies.

GeneWurx.com